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A B S T R A C T
This study tests competing hypotheses about public support
for European integration and projects referendum voting
behaviour. It emphasizes anti-immigration sentiments as a
key variable for understanding reluctance about integration.
Drawing on survey data, it is shown that anti-immigration
sentiments, economic considerations and the evaluation of
domestic governments are the strongest predictors of both
attitudinal support for integration and individuals’ propen-
sity to vote ‘yes’ in a referendum on the enlargement of the
European Union (EU).
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Why do some people embrace the notion of European integration whereas
others oppose it? This question has generated a considerable and growing
amount of scholarly research and popular debate. The usual suspects for
understanding variation in popular support for integration include levels of
cognitive mobilization (e.g. Inglehart, 1970), utilitarian and economic
considerations (e.g. Gabel and Palmer, 1995), satisfaction with the incumbent
government (e.g. Franklin et al., 1995; Ray, 2003), as well as social-
demographic characteristics and political-ideological preferences (e.g. Gabel,
1998a). More recently, considerations of national identity such as national
pride and territorial identity (Carey, 2002), national attachment and exclusive
national identity (Marks and Hooghe, 2003), fear of loss of national identity
(Christin and Trechsel, 2002), and perceived cultural threat (McLaren, 2002)
have been added to the equation.
We first briefly review each of these explanations. Then we discuss the
relevance of anti-immigration sentiments in explaining EU support. McLaren
(2002) emphasizes cultural threat as an important negative predictor of EU
support. We argue that it is rather people’s negative out-group bias that
explains opposition to European integration. Drawing on originally collected
survey data, we simultaneously assess the power of the different expla-
nations. Our study confirms the importance of economic evaluations and
domestic political considerations and it explicates the importance of immi-
gration-related attitudes. In addition to explaining attitudinal support for the
EU, we also demonstrate how the same predictors might influence the
outcome of future referendums on European integration issues. Our indi-
vidual-level model of the propensity to vote ‘yes’ in an EU referendum shows
that the predictors driving attitudes towards European integration are also
the strongest predictors when modelling vote choice.
Why public opinion about the European Union matters
The European Union is often referred to as an elitist project that does not have
widespread public support. Considerable effort has gone into exposing and
analysing the democratic deficit of the EU. Inherent in this debate is the notion
of legitimacy. As Scharpf (1970) argues, legitimacy builds upon principles of
the authorization of power-holders, responsiveness in the exercise of power,
and accountability. The democratic deficit is a lack of legitimacy, in that EU
decisions are not sufficiently responsive to public preferences and scrutiny
(Scharpf, 1997). This gap between elite opinion and public opinion on
European integration has also been established in more empirical terms,
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showing differences in the areas in which political elites and European publics
are willing to confer power to the EU (Hooghe, 2003).
Given the weak system of authorization of power-holders through
European Parliamentary elections (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996),
arguably legitimacy has to come not only from elections but also from the
process of governance. This can take a number of forms. Most directly, public
preferences can be established through referendums on issues of European
integration. European integration is the most voted-on issue in the world (de
Vreese and Semetko, 2004a), and the use of referendums to decide on issues
of membership, key policies, endorsement of treaties and constitutional
documents is increasing. Nevertheless, obviously only a small fraction of EU
decisions is legitimized by public support in a referendum.
In general, political systems are viable on condition that they enjoy public
support. This is particularly true for the European Union, which, in the
absence of, for example, supranational means of law enforcement, depends
on public support and acceptance (Caldeira and Gibson, 1995). The ingredi-
ents shaping public support for European integration are, however, contested.
Below, we review previous strands of research as well as articulate the import-
ance of anti-immigration sentiments in public support for European inte-
gration.
Cognitive mobilization
Inglehart (1970) suggested that citizens with high cognitive mobilization are
more at ease with a supranational entity. Later, Inglehart (1977) argued that
citizens who have a political value system favouring non-material values
(such as self-fulfilment and concerns with democracy) above material values
(such as financial security) are more favourable towards European inte-
gration. The first group, dubbed as post-materialists, is likely to perceive
European integration as a vehicle for social reform and tend to consider
politics at a more abstract level, which (according to Inglehart) promotes
support for the EU.
This idea was demonstrated using bivariate analyses of Eurobarometer
data but – as, for example, Gabel (1998a) has suggested – the conclusions are
at best tentative given the lack of consistent empirical support in the data and
the absence of controls for other, potentially confounding factors such as
education. Later analyses have found only limited support for this idea, either
by limiting the argument to original member states only (Anderson and
Reichert, 1996) or by controlling for a number of the explanations outlined
below (Gabel, 1998a).
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Cost/benefit analysis
The second group of studies posits that ‘EU citizens from different socio-
economic situations experience different costs and benefits from integrative
policy’ (Gabel, 1998a: 336). These studies explain support for European inte-
gration in terms of income, education, occupational skills and proximity to
border regions (e.g. Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel and Palmer, 1995).
Pepermans and Verleye (1998) found national economic pride and satisfaction
to be a key explanatory variable in support for the euro across the EU coun-
tries (for conflicting evidence, see Bosch and Newton, 1995). Anderson (1998)
showed that, when contrasting economic and political effects in a simul-
taneous multivariate analysis, economic variables were in part mediated by
political variables. This, he suggests, calls for the inclusion of political vari-
ables to understand variation in popular support.
Domestic politics
The key political variables come from the domestic political realm. The
argument is that, given the low level of actual information about the inte-
gration processes, citizens are likely to resort to proxies when formulating
their view on integration, and these proxies are likely to be based on national
political considerations (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1994). In particular,
the importance of government approval and support for incumbent political
parties has been considered.
Franklin and colleagues (Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1995) even
go on to say that domestic political considerations drive not only opinions
about integration but also voting behaviour in European elections and
national referendums on European issues: ‘referenda conducted in the
context of national party politics, with the government of the day urging
ratification of a treaty they have themselves negotiated, will inevitably be
contaminated by popular feelings about the government’ (Franklin et al.,
1995: 102).1
National identity and threats to national and cultural integrity
A number of recent studies suggest that citizens’ feelings of national attach-
ment and their perceptions of threats to the nation-state and to the nation’s
interests and cultural integrity are potential considerations when express-
ing support for the EU (Kritzinger, 2003). Marks and Hooghe (2003) differ-
entiate between cultural and economic threats and find these, when
controlling for economic evaluations, to have a significant impact on EU
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support. For the Swiss case, Christin and Trechsel (2002) show that
perceived threat to national interests is a strong predictor of support for
joining the EU. This perceived threat in turn is strongly related to the image
people hold of neighbouring countries and to their attachment to core
Swiss values. Furthermore, their analysis reveals that a strong national
identity and perceptions of negative consequences of EU membership for
the general economy are directly and negatively related to support for
membership.
Whereas Christin and Trechsel (2002) consider the perceived threat to
national interests, McLaren (2002) argues that reluctance about integration is
a function of the perceived cultural threat. She contends that it is the ‘changing
nature of the nation and the nation-state that will lead many Europeans to be
critical of the EU – since this institution is likely to be seen as contributing to
this change’ (McLaren, 2002: 554). Her argument is that, given that European
citizens have been socialized to accept the power and sovereignty of the
nation-state, the idea of advanced European integration, which implies a
potentially weakened role for the nation-state and a redistribution of sover-
eignty, poses a threat to the symbolic value of the nation-state. Threats may
come from non-national changes in society, including immigration and
globalization.
Both studies frame their threat argument in terms of feelings of
national identity and national attachment, but the conceptualization of
threat differs considerably. McLaren (2002: 555) contends that ‘it is the
protection of the in-group (the nation) and the group identity that is at
stake’. Although she acknowledges that her variables indeed measure
underlying feelings of xenophobia, she presents her findings in the light of
in-group protection and national attachment. Christin and Trechsel (2002),
by contrast, measure the strength of national identity and find that national
identity relates to EU support as well as to the perceived threat to national
interests of EU integration. However, since they are not simultaneously
controlling for general economic expectations, it remains an open question
whether it is indeed the perceived threat to national interests that drives
EU membership support.2
In sum, these studies leave us with an inconclusive picture. We know that
identity considerations matter, but it remains open whether it is individuals’
feelings of attachment to the nation-state and its values and institutions,
whether it is their sense of having an exclusive national identity, or whether
it is the perceived threat to the nation-state that really matter for supporting
European integration.
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Immigration
The present study extends and explicates McLaren’s (2002) argument that it
is the threat posed by outsiders that fuels public anti-EU integration senti-
ments rather than merely identity-based considerations. Recent political
developments and changes in the political landscape in a number of European
countries might have implications for political attitudes. Therefore, it is
important to consider certain attitudes beyond support for the incumbent
government as a reference point for citizens when expressing their opinion
about European integration. Europe has experienced an increase in popularity
of anti-immigrant and often anti-EU populist political parties.3 We know that,
on the individual level, anti-immigration sentiments are among the core
predictors of support for populist parties (Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug
et al., 2000). In recent years, anti-immigration sentiments have been moving
to the forefront of politically relevant attitudes in a number of European coun-
tries. The popularity of populist anti-immigrant parties serves as an indicator
of the relevance and significance of immigration-related attitudes for political
opinion formation. We are not thereby asserting that right-wing parties cause
anti-EU sentiments; however, we believe that an increasing and negative
emphasis on immigration-related issues in domestic politics might cause
people to consider their stance on this issue when forming an opinion about
the EU.
Why might people’s attitudes towards immigration be related to support
for European integration? Sniderman et al. (2000: 62–8) identify people’s
readiness to categorize themselves or others into groups as the central and
common factor in the formation of hostility towards immigrants. Minimal
group experiments (e.g. Tajfel, 1981) and social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel and
Turner, 1979; for an overview see Brown, 2000) inform us that, based upon
group categorization, people tend to show a favourable bias towards
members of their own group and an unfavourable one against members of
other groups. Thus, people have a tendency to make in-group versus out-
group distinctions that are advantageous for their in-group and unfavourable
for the out-group. It has been shown that people who tend to categorize immi-
grants into an out-group are also more likely to categorize others into out-
groups in general and also to show hostility towards these (Sniderman et al.,
2000: 87–9).
Following this, we can expect that Europeans holding negative attitudes
towards immigrants will show a greater readiness to categorize others in
general, which is likely to yield unfavourable evaluations of these out-groups.
European integration brings together people from different countries, regions
and cultures, and arguably with different religions and ethnicities, who can
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be readily categorized on the basis of these features. This fuels negative
assessments of these groups, and therefore people holding negative attitudes
towards immigrants are more likely to reject the idea of further European
integration. It is not in-group favouritism but rather a negative out-group
bias, indicated by hostility towards immigrants, that matters in understand-
ing support for the EU.
McLaren (2002) demonstrates the importance of immigration attitudes in
understanding support for European integration. Although she frames her
argument as a perceived threat to the nation-state, the measures from the
Eurobarometer utilized to operationalize this perceived threat are in fact
closely related to indicators of anti-immigration sentiment. She thereby force-
fully demonstrates that previous research on public support has missed a key
variable driving opposition to European integration. We extend McLaren’s
work by employing measures directly concerning immigration and a greater
array of themes, and not solely measuring threat perceptions. National
identity and economic concerns are related to anti-immigration sentiments
but anti-immigration attitudes are conceptually different from national
identity (Sniderman et al., 2004). Anti-immigration sentiments tap people’s
readiness to show negative out-group bias and therefore to oppose further
European integration; they are not a proxy measure for national identity
because personality traits and personal values, as well as perceptions of group
competition or a general sense of insecurity, can cause people’s hostility
towards immigrants. It is the combination of these factors into a politically
relevant attitude, we believe, that makes people more likely to oppose
European integration. Our argument is that there is a great need to specify
the particular role that anti-immigration sentiments play in support for
European integration, in particular in the context of the increased electoral
significance of populist parties campaigning on anti-immigration and anti-
EU policies, which indicates the increasing prominence and political
relevance of anti-immigration attitudes.
Hypotheses
We hypothesize the following relationships between a number of individual
characteristics and attitudes and support for European integration:
H1: Low levels of fear of immigration are related to higher levels of support, as
argued above. 
H2: Positive evaluations of the incumbent government are related to higher
support (Franklin et al., 1994).
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H3: Positive economic evaluations are related to higher support (Anderson, 1998).
H4: Higher levels of political sophistication are related to higher support (Ingle-
hart, 1970).
In addition – for a full model specification – we control for gender, age,
education, occupation, political values and ideology, which we predict to be
related to support as follows: men are more supportive (see Gabel, 1998a;
Nelsen and Guth, 2000), higher educational groups are more supportive (see
Gabel, 1998a), executive and managerial occupations are more supportive 
(see Gabel, 1998a), post-materialistic values are related to higher support (see
Inglehart, 1970), and centre and right ideological preferences are related to
higher support (see Gabel, 1998a).
We test these hypotheses in one model. However, we take our argument
one step further and link attitudes towards integration to referendum voting
behaviour (see also Gabel, 1998b). Previous studies of EU-related referendums
have not included measures for all the relevant antecedents of public support
for the EU (for an overview, see de Vreese and Semetko, 2004b). Moreover,
none of these referendum studies has specifically addressed the role that atti-
tudes towards immigration might play. We therefore also assess the impact
of the different predictors of support for European integration in the form of
vote choice in a referendum on a European integration topic. We model vote
choice using the same measures of support for European integration – also
hypothesizing the same direction of influence – given that previous research
on EU-related referendums has emphasized these variables too (see, e.g., de
Vreese and Semetko, 2004b; Franklin et al., 1995; Hug, 2003; Siune and
Svensson, 1993; Svensson, 2002). We thereby employ an attitudinal as well as
a behaviour-intention dependent variable to show that the predictors driving
attitudes towards the EU also matter when people are asked to support or
reject further integration through direct voting behaviour in a referendum.
Methods
We test our model of support for European integration by drawing on newly
collected survey data in two EU countries: Denmark and the Netherlands. We
chose these two countries for a variety of reasons: first, the populations in the
two countries show a similar level of support for the EU (Eurobarometer 58,
2003);4 second, satisfaction with EU democracy is comparable in the two
countries (Karp et al., 2003); third, the economic situation in the two coun-
tries is similar (OECD, 2002); fourth, and of particular significance for this
study, both countries have experienced the electoral success of populist
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parties campaigning on strong anti-immigration messages, which indicates
that anti-immigration sentiments are an important political attitude among
both populations.5
We rely on two identical surveys of representative samples of the Danish
and Dutch adult populations. The surveys were carried out in November
2002.6 The sample sizes were 1444 in Denmark and 2396 in the Netherlands.
The response rates were 77.9% in Denmark and 70.9% in the Netherlands.7
All previous research on public support for European integration has relied
on Eurobarometer data. With our data we can provide a novel link between
attitudes towards European integration and voting intention, which is not
possible using Eurobarometer data.
Measures
The first dependent variable was an index of support for the EU, measured by
five items tapping general attitudes and opinions about (the extent of)
European integration (Denmark: M = 3.12, SD = 0.86, alpha = 0.82; the
Netherlands: M = 2.99, SD = 0.61, alpha = 0.68). Answers were given on
five-point agree–disagree scales:
(1) European integration is being pushed too fast
(2) The EU is a threat to smaller countries such as Denmark/the Netherlands
(3) I would be willing to make a sacrifice to help a less strong country
(4) The membership of Denmark/the Netherlands is a good thing
(5) The EU has more disadvantages than advantages for people like me
The items were recoded when appropriate to form a scale of EU support.8
Our second dependent variable was a measure of voting intention in a refer-
endum on the enlargement of the European Union. The question was: ‘If a
referendum were held on the issue of the enlargement of the EU, would you
vote in favour or against the enlargement?’9 We emphasize that we are not
making inferences about the substantive level of support (‘yes’ votes) in a
referendum, but rather are focusing on the underlying explanations.
The independent variables included gender (coded as female), age (in
years), education10 and occupational status. For the last variable, we follow
Gabel (1998a: 343), who summarizes that ‘manual laborers and the unem-
ployed will be less supportive of integration than executives and
professionals’.11 Ideological preference was tapped by a 10-point left–right
self-placement measure. To test the ‘cognitive mobilization’ theory, we used
an index of political sophistication. This is a combined measure of political
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knowledge and political interest. Political values were assessed using a
standard measure tapping post-materialism (Inglehart, 1990) by asking
respondents to rate the two most important tasks of the government (see the
appendix). We used respondents’ assessment of the domestic government on
a five-point scale from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’ to measure the impact of
domestic political considerations. To test the utilitarian perspective, we
included occupational status and in addition used a measure of economic
evaluation (following Anderson, 1998) in the form of economic expectations
for the coming 12 months ranging from ‘a lot worse’ to ‘a lot better’.
Finally, we included a five-item index measuring anti-immigrant senti-
ments focusing on out-group perceptions (Denmark: M = 3.43, SD = 0.83,
alpha = 0.83; the Netherlands: M = 3.40, SD = 0.78, alpha = 0.82).12 The
means and standard deviations of the indexes as well as the specific wording
of all items can be found in the appendix.13 The specified regression models
are ordinary least squares (OLS) models. The voting intention model is a
logistic regression model with ‘intention to vote Yes’ (coded as 1) as the
dependent variable.
Results
Our multivariate analyses (Table 1), in which the explanatory value of the
different predictors is assessed simultaneously, shows that in both countries
the strongest predictor was anti-immigration sentiments, negatively predict-
ing support for European integration (H1). Positive evaluations of the incum-
bent government (H2) and optimistic economic assessments (H3) were, as
hypothesized, positive, significant predictors of support. Political sophisti-
cation (H4) positively predicted support for integration and this was signifi-
cant in Denmark. Gender was a negative predictor of support for European
integration (significant in Denmark) and age was a significant negative
predictor in the Netherlands. Education was a positive predictor in both coun-
tries. We found no significant effects of occupational status. In Denmark, post-
materialist values were negatively related to support for European 
integration. Finally, left ideological preference was a significant negative
predictor in Denmark whereas right ideological preference was a significant
negative predictor in the Netherlands.
We further estimated a model of ‘yes’ voting intention in a referendum
on the enlargement of the EU. Using the same predictors as in our previous
model, we find – by and large – a confirmation of the predictors for under-
standing not only opinions but also behavioural intentions. Table 2 shows
the results of a logistic regression model estimating the likelihood of voting
European Union Politics 6(1)6 8
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‘yes’ with positive coefficients indicating a higher probability of voting ‘yes’.
The results show that anti-immigration sentiments were a strong negative
predictor for a ‘yes’ vote, namely fuelling the propensity to vote ‘no’. Govern-
ment approval and positive economic evaluations were the most important
positive predictors for a ‘yes’ vote. Additionally, political sophistication was
a positive predictor in Denmark, and was significant only in Denmark. Indi-
viduals with right-wing political leanings differed significantly from centrists
(our reference category) in their negative association with voting ‘yes’ in the
Netherlands, and women were less likely to vote ‘yes’ in Denmark. Finally,
age was positively associated with voting ‘yes’ in Denmark. Although the
analysis enables us to distinguish relevant predictors for understanding a
‘yes’ vote, the model also allows for a comparison of the relative importance
of each predictor. This is shown in the ‘predicted probabilities’ columns of
Table 2.
Given the robustness of our findings that anti-immigration sentiments,
economic evaluations and evaluation of the domestic government are
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Table 1 Regression analysis of support for European integration
Denmark The Netherlands
Std. beta Standard Std. beta Standard 
coefficient error coefficient error
Gender (female) –0.08** 0.05 –0.01 0.03
Age 0.02 0.00 –0.06** 0.00
Education 0.06* 0.03 0.06** 0.02
Unemployed/blue collar –0.04 0.06 –0.04 0.03
Executive/managers 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03
Left ideological preference –0.09** 0.07 0.00 0.03
Right ideological preference 0.04 0.06 –0.06** 0.03
Anti-immigration attitudes –0.39*** 0.06 –0.34*** 0.00
Post-materialist values –0.08** 0.03 –0.00 0.01
Political sophistication 0.18*** 0.02 0.01 0.01
Evaluation incumbent government 0.19*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.01
Economic evaluations 0.07* 0.04 0.21*** 0.02
n 1084 2040
R2 0.24 0.22
Note: OLS regression.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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Table 2 Logistic regression analysis of ‘yes’ vote in referendum on EU enlargement
Denmark The Netherlands
Beta Standard Predicted Beta Standard Predicted 
coefficient error probabilities coefficient error probabilities
Gender (female) –0.73*** 0.17 0.48 0.01 0.10 1.01
Age 0.03*** 0.01 1.03 0.01 0.01 1.00
Education 0.13 0.11 1.14 –0.11 0.09 0.89
Unemployed/blue collar –0.05 0.23 0.96 0.04 0.12 1.05
Executive/managers –0.21 0.21 0.81 –0.03 0.11 0.97
Left ideological preference –0.31 0.27 0.74 0.02 0.14 1.02
Right ideological preference –0.04 0.21 0.96 –0.42*** 0.12 0.65
Anti-immigration attitudes –1.31*** 0.13 0.27 –0.94*** 0.08 0.39
Post-materialist values –0.18 0.11 0.83 –0.05 0.05 0.95
Political sophistication 0.23*** 0.06 1.25 –0.05 0.03 0.96
Evaluation incumbent government 0.36*** 0.10 1.43 0.16** 0.06 1.18
Economic evaluations 0.34 * 0.14 1.40 0.61*** 0.06 1.84
n 846 2041
Correctly classified 76.5 68.2
–2 log likelihood 855.05 2457.22
Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 0.30 0.22
Note: Logistic regression.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
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consistently the strongest predictors, we model the effects of each of these
key predictors on the likelihood of voting ‘yes’.
Figures 1 and 2 are illustrations of the estimates provided in Table 2 and
demonstrate the likelihood of voting ‘yes’ by a one-unit increase in the level
of government approval, economic evaluations and anti-immigration 
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Figure 1 The Netherlands: Likelihood of voting ‘yes’ when changing the level of (a)
economic evaluations, (b) government approval, or (c) fear of immigration.
Figure 2 Denmark: Likelihood of voting ‘yes’ when changing the level of (a)
economic evaluations, (b) government approval, or (c) fear of immigration.
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sentiments, respectively. The predicted probabilities of voting ‘yes’ are calcu-
lated by holding all variables constant at their mode (dummy variables) or
their mean (remaining variables). Respondents expressing scepticism and
reluctance towards immigration were more likely to vote ‘no’ than were
voters generally in favour of or less hesitant towards immigration. The slopes
in both countries are relatively steep, indicating that any increase in the level
of anti-immigration sentiments is associated with a considerable increase in
the likelihood of voting ‘no’. In the case of government approval, respondents
expressing more satisfaction with the government were more likely to vote
‘yes’. This slope is steeper in Denmark than in the Netherlands, indicating
that an increase in government approval is related to a modest increase in the
likelihood of voting ‘yes’ in the Netherlands and a considerable increase in
the likelihood of voting ‘yes’ in Denmark. In the case of economic evaluations,
this pattern is reversed. In both countries, respondents expressing more
optimism about the economy were more likely to vote ‘yes’. However, this
slope is much steeper in the Netherlands than in Denmark. This suggests that
an increase in economic evaluations is related to a modest increase in the like-
lihood of voting ‘yes’ in Denmark and a considerable increase in the likeli-
hood of voting ‘yes’ in the Netherlands. These illustrations stress the
importance and relevance of all three predictors.
Looking at Figures 1 and 2, we see that in all cases (except economic
evaluations in Denmark) the slope crosses the .50 line, which is the decisive
point for a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ vote. This means that each of the factors can lead
to significant changes in the propensity to vote in favour of or against a
proposal in a referendum. It is particularly important to note that only a slight
increase in the level of anti-immigration sentiments decreases the likelihood
of voting ‘yes’.
Discussion
In our analysis of the forces that drive popular support for European inte-
gration, three explanations emerge as particularly powerful: anti-immigration
sentiments, economic evaluations, and support for the domestic government.
Extending McLaren’s (2002) work, we thus explicate public attitudes towards
immigration as an important predictor of public support for European inte-
gration. This finding supports our assumption that people’s readiness to
negatively categorize out-groups, measured by attitudes towards immigrants,
is influential in support for European integration. Economic considerations
have been articulated strongly in the literature on public support for the EU
(e.g. Gabel, 1998a; Gabel and Palmer, 1995). We find partial evidence of this
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argument in the multivariate analysis. The liberalization of labour markets in
the EU is likely to favour individuals with good job skills and high levels of
education (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). We find this relationship confirmed in
our analysis, but education is a stronger predictor than occupational status,
which shows no significant coefficient. Our findings corroborate Gabel
(1998a), who found economic evaluations to be significantly linked to the level
of support for EU membership. The evaluation of domestic governments as
a predictor of support for European integration has been articulated particu-
larly in relation to referendums on European topics (Franklin et al., 1995). The
relevance of domestic political considerations for general EU support,
however, has been confirmed in most studies of diffuse support outside the
electoral situation (e.g. Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998a; McLaren, 2002). We also
find that citizens draw on their perceptions of the performance of the national
government when expressing support for or opposition to European inte-
gration.14
In this study, we went beyond explaining attitudes to assess voting inten-
tion as well. We modelled voting intention in a referendum on the enlarge-
ment of the EU and illustrated how differences in economic evaluations,
government support and anti-immigration sentiments can influence the like-
lihood of voting ‘yes’ in such a referendum. We emphasize that we do not
draw any substantive conclusions about the level of support for enlargement
(as expressed in the share of ‘yes’ votes), but we stress the importance of the
underlying dynamics and predictors of the vote. Given the increase in the use
of national referendums on European issues, we can speculate about EU-
related referendums, including the wave of national referendums on the EU
Constitution.
With the continuing social and political importance of immigration issues
and in an economic climate characterized by recession or economic stag-
nation, the conditions for rejecting proposals on further European integration
are present for European citizens. Citizens may differentiate between support-
ing enlargement (the measure used in our study) and endorsing the Consti-
tution, for example. Whereas the former applies to the notion of wider
integration, the latter concerns deeper integration. However, our analyses
clearly show that the same mechanisms are at play when understanding both
diffuse support for European integration and specific support for enlarge-
ment.
Sniderman et al.’s (2000) ‘right-shock model’ predicts that when a society
is exposed to an external shock, such as economic recession or increasing
levels of immigration, anti-immigration sentiments will flourish. This view is
supported by studies explaining the rise of right-wing parties in Western
Europe by high rates of unemployment (Jackman and Volpert, 1996), large
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numbers of non-Western residents in a country (Lubbers et al., 2002), or large
numbers of asylum seekers (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001).15 Recent studies,
however, find only unemployment to be related to support for right-wing
parties in interaction with the level of immigration (Golder, 2003a, 2003b) or
even demonstrate a negative relationship between unemployment and radical
right support (Knigge, 1998). Anyway, it is shown that contextual factors
matter, and if Sniderman et al.’s (2000) model travels beyond the case of Italy
there is reason to worry about the level of public support for European inte-
gration. The almost Europe-wide economic stagnation in the years 2000–3
may generate higher levels of anti-immigration sentiments. Such attitudes are,
as demonstrated in this study, of key importance for understanding public
opinion about European integration and they are likely to affect public
support for European integration negatively.16
With our study, we emphasize the implications of understanding public
opinion about European integration. Of course an investigation with more
variation at the contextual level (in terms of differences in economic
conditions and popularity of anti-immigration sentiments) is desirable. For
instance, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) demonstrated the contingent importance of
domestic political considerations as benchmarks in understanding support
for the EU. He found that support is higher in countries that suffer from
corruption and have less developed welfare states. In such societies, the EU
was viewed positively in comparison with the nation-state, whereas it is
perceived as a threat in other countries. We demonstrated our model in two
comparable societies with similar economic situations and experience of
popular anti-immigration parties. We hope this study will spark broader
comparative studies that will provide more variation and power to the expla-
nations. We stress the importance of public support as an inherent require-
ment of the legitimacy of European integration. This support may be indirect
and expressed in surveys but, on significant occasions, the opinions of citizens
matter in very explicit and direct ways for political decision-making, such as
in the case of referendums on European integration issues. Considering the
importance of anti-immigration sentiments and of economic evaluations in a
referendum, any government calling a referendum and wanting to see its
proposal endorsed must be very popular to compensate for the negative
impact of economic pessimism and anti-immigration sentiments.
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Appendix: Overview of independent variables
Gender: female = 1, male = 0.
Age: in years.
Education: recoded into four categories, comparable across the two countries:
1 – primary school; 2 – high school or equivalent (about 13 years of training);
3 – BA or three years’ vocational training or equivalent (16 years); and 4 –
Master’s or postgraduate training (19+ years).
Low occupational status: recoded dummy variable. Occupation was recoded
based on Eurobarometer occupational classifications (see e.g. Eurobarometer
60). Unemployed and blue-collar workers were recoded as 1, otherwise 0.
High occupational status: recoded dummy variable. Occupation was recoded
based on Eurobarometer occupational classifications (see e.g., Eurobarometer
58). Executive and managerial occupations were recoded as 1, otherwise 0.
Left political ideology: self-placement on left–right scale, where 1 = left and 10
= right; 1–3 coded as 1, otherwise 0.
Right political ideology: self-placement on left–right scale where 1 = left and
10 = right; 7–10 coded as 1, otherwise 0.
Political sophistication: a combined measure of political knowledge and
political interest. Five questions tapped political knowledge:
• ‘What is the number of Commissioners in the EU Commission?’ – open-
ended, correct answer (20 Commissioners) coded as 1, otherwise 0
• ‘What is the name of the current President of the European Commission?’
– open-ended, correct answer (Prodi) coded as 1, otherwise 0
• ‘What is the name of the Danish or Dutch Commissioner?’ – open-ended,
coded as 1 or 0, correct answer (Nielson or Bolkestein)
• ‘Which country currently holds the Presidency of the EU?’ – correct
answer (Denmark) coded as 1, otherwise 0 
• ‘What is the number of countries seeking membership of the EU?’ –
correct answers (10, 12 and 13) coded as 1, otherwise 0.
Political interest was a single item ranging from 1 (‘no political interest’) to 4
(‘high tapped political interest’). The sophistication index ranges from 1 to 9.
Denmark: M = 5.02, SD = 1.60; the Netherlands: M = 3.54, SD = 1.64.
Anti-immigrant sentiments: five-item index measuring anti-immigrant senti-
ment: 1 – immigration is good for the labour market; 2 –immigrants cause
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problems in the schools that their children attend; 3 – immigrants enrich
Danish or Dutch culture; 4 – members of immigrant groups misuse Danish
or Dutch social welfare; and 5 – their religion is a threat to our way of life.
The items were recoded when appropriate to form a scale of anti-immigrant
sentiments. Denmark: M = 3.43, SD = 0.83, alpha = 0.83; the Netherlands:
M = 3.40, SD = 0.78, alpha = 0.82.
Post-materialism: Two questions in which the respondent was asked to rate the
most important and the second most important task of the government. The
options were: 1 – maintain law and order (materialistic); 2 – give citizens a
greater say in important government decisions (post-materialism); 3 – control
prices (materialism); 4 – protect freedom of expression measures (post-
materialism). The ratings were recoded as: 1 (two materialism choices), 2 (one
materialism and one post-materialism choice), 3 (one post-materialism and
one materialism choice) or 4 (two post-materialism choices). Denmark: M =
2.12, SD = 0.82; the Netherlands: M = 2.29, SD = 0.98.
Evaluation of domestic government: a scaled measure ranging from 1 to 5, where
1 = very bad, 3 = neither good nor bad, and 5 = very good. Denmark: M
= 3.65, SD = 1.08; the Netherlands: M = 3.25, SD = 1.06.
Economic evaluation: a scaled measure ranging from 1 to 5 of economic expec-
tations in the coming 12 months, where 1 = a lot worse, 3 = neither worse
nor better, and 5 = a lot better. Denmark: M = 3.08, SD = 0.63; the Nether-
lands: M = 3.07, SD = 0.82.
Notes
The study was made possible through a research grant from the Danish Social
Science Research Council to Claes de Vreese. He thanks the Center for European
Studies at Harvard University and the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) for
providing a stimulating work environment when the article was being written.
The data used for this study will become available through the Danish Data
Archive (Dansk Data Arkiv). The authors thank Susan Banducci, Mark Franklin,
Stefaan Walgrave and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 Later, this thesis was modified to apply in particular to referendums on issues
that are of low salience to the electorate (Franklin, 2002) and in particular in
years in which European elections or referendums are held (Ray, 2003).
2 In addition, Carey (2002) tests the impact of three different conceptualiza-
tions of national identity: national pride, territorial identification, and
perceived cultural threat. He shows that national pride most strongly and
negatively affects support for EU integration. However, territorial identifi-
cation and perceived cultural threat also are significantly related to EU
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support. These findings somewhat counter Christin and Trechsel’s (2002)
results. They argue that ‘national identity’ is only weakly related to support
for Swiss EU membership, whereas ‘perceived threat to national interests’ is
strongly related to support. Marks and Hooghe (2003) also test the impact of
different concepts of national identity and perceived threat. They find that
feelings of exclusive national identity and perceived cultural threat are nega-
tively related to EU support whereas attachment to the nation and embrac-
ing multiculturalism are positive predictors of support.
3 Although these parties are not easily comparable (see e.g. Fennema, 1997)
and their supporters might have different motivations for voting for them
(see Billiet and de Witte, 1995; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug and
Fennema, 2003, for competing explanations), they all contributed to bringing
the issues of immigration and the integration of foreigners to the top of the
political and public agenda.
4 Eurobarometer 58 showed that 61% of the population in Denmark and 69%
in the Netherlands support their country’s membership of the EU and 69%
and 64%, respectively, believe that their country has benefited from member-
ship.
5 Immigration-related issues have been high on the public and political agenda
for the past few years in Denmark and the Netherlands (see e.g. Andersen et
al., 1999, for Denmark and Sniderman et al., 2004, for the Netherlands). Dansk
Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark and Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands
have both contributed to government, DF by constituting the parliamentary
majority for the Danish Liberal–Conservative government (2001–) and LPF
by forming a short-lived three-party coalition with CDA and VVD in 2002.
6 The specific fieldwork days were 21–28 November 2002 in Denmark, and
19–26 November 2002 in the Netherlands.
7 In Denmark, the sample was drawn from the GfK Danmark database. A
nationally representative sample of 1807 Danish adult (age 15+) individuals
was invited to participate in the study. The questionnaire was a postal self-
administered paper and pencil questionnaire. The response rate is not
unusual for survey research in Scandinavia, where turnout is also compara-
tively high (Granberg and Holmberg, 1991). In the Netherlands, the sample
was drawn from the ITM International database, which has more than 55,000
respondents. A nationally representative sample of 5321 Dutch adults (age
15+) was invited to participate in the study. The questionnaire was Web
administered. Making use of a similar lay-out for the questionnaire in the two
countries, potential confounds owing to question and response category
layout were taken into account (Dillman, 2000). To assess the quality of our
data, we included the standard Eurobarometer ‘support for country’s EU
membership’ question in our survey: 60% of our respondents in Denmark
and 66% in the Netherlands reported considering the membership of their
country in the EU to be a good thing. This compares with 61% and 69%,
respectively, in the autumn Eurobarometer 58, which was carried out in
October 2002.
8 A factor analysis (PCA with varimax rotation) confirmed the one-dimensional
nature, with all item loadings strongly on one factor, with an Eigen value of
2.95, explaining 59% of the variance.
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9 This question measures a behavioural intention (which may differ from actual
behaviour) and there is a tendency to over-report participation in intention
measures (e.g. Belli et al., 1999). However, although vote turnout is often
inflated, there is no reason to expect a structural bias in this voting choice
measure.
10 Respondents’ reported level of completed education was recoded because of
differences in the educational systems; see the appendix.
11 We included these two groups as dummy variables in the analysis. A more
elaborate model including unemployed, manual workers, managers, house-
wives/husbands, white-collar workers, and executives separately (see
McLaren, 2002) did not yield different results. We include the recoded
categories for presentational reasons.
12 Unlike in the Eurobarometer, these questions were not asked after a question
probing the respondent for whether s/he feels that s/he belongs to one of
the majority or minority groups in a country. This potentially biases Euro-
barometer respondents towards thinking about in-groups and out-groups
prior to answering questions about immigration. Our measures resemble
McLaren’s (2002) measures of cultural threat but specifically tap attitudes
towards immigrants and not just threat perceptions.
13 Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test national identity-based expla-
nations for EU support. We would encourage studies that disentangle the
relationship between different identity approaches and related indicators of
anti-immigration sentiments.
14 The different predictive power of government evaluation and economic evalu-
ations might be attributed to the political situation in the two countries in
autumn 2002. Denmark was governed by a stable Liberal–Conservative coali-
tion government, which was a likely point of evaluation. The Netherlands,
however, was governed by the three-party coalition that emerged out of the
May 2002 elections in the aftermath of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. In
November 2002, the government had already announced new general elections
for January 2003 and was therefore not perceived to be a powerful acting entity.
This de-emphasized the importance of government evaluations as a predictor
of support and highlighted economic evaluations. Moreover, Danes are used to
having proposals put to them by their government on European matters
whereas the Dutch are not. These contextual explanations stress the importance
of including measures of both economic and government evaluation, because
these are related (as demonstrated by Anderson, 1998; Clarke et al., 2000).
15 Since economic concerns are another exogenous variable in our full model of
support for European integration, potential problems of multicollinearity
arise. The bivariate correlation between economic evaluations and immi-
gration attitudes is .34, which is significant but does not cause concern about
multicollinearity. Furthermore, we know that sociodemographics, personal-
ity traits and authoritarian values (Sniderman et al., 2000), as well as exposure
to mass media content (Vergeer, 2000), can cause hostility towards immi-
grants. Future research needs to disentangle the relationship between
national identity and immigration attitudes as predictors of EU support. This
study represents a first step in emphasizing the importance of considering
immigration attitudes.
European Union Politics 6(1)7 8
03 devreese (ds)  17/1/05  11:51 am  Page 78
16 Of course, a bad economic situation as such also affects economic evaluations,
which in turn have a negative impact on support for the EU.
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